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THE RIGHT DEED FOR THE WRONG REASON: A
CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF REGULATION A+
AND ITS RATIONALES
Louis Anthony Steiner*
The recent enactment of Regulation A+ makes it possible for the first
time for companies to conduct retail equity crowdfunding (i.e., equity
crowdfunding campaigns involving general solicitation of
unaccredited investors). On its surface, Regulation A+ seems poised
to provide dual benefits to start-ups by both democratizing access to
capital and easing the transition into public company status. However,
Regulation A+ is largely a solution in search of a problem. There is
little empirical evidence of an equity gap for early stage companies,
nor is there evidence that the recent dip in small-company IPOs has
anything to do with regulatory burdens. While Regulation A+’s two
main raisons d’etre are likely misguided, the regulation may still
provide modest, but important, social benefits. Close enforcement is
needed, however, to ensure these benefits do not come at the cost of
market integrity and potential losses to ordinary investors.
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INTRODUCTION
It is estimated that over $5.1 billion in funds were raised via
crowdfunding in 2013.1 Prosper and Lending Club, the two largest peerto-peer lenders, made $1.7 billion in loans in 2014, up from a mere $26
million in 2009.2 Meanwhile, crowdfunding in real estate grew by 156%
in 2014 to a total of over $1 billion.3 A recent World Bank study found
that “[b]y 2025, the global crowdfunding market could reach between $90
billion and $96 billion—roughly 1.8 times the size of the global venture
capital industry today.”4 Crowdfunding in its various forms has taken the
world by storm, and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”)
recent enactment of Regulation A+ could open the floodgates even wider
by enabling companies to conduct retail equity crowdfunding raises of up
to $50 million at a time.5
Whether equity crowdfunding holds the potential to spur economic
development is still up for debate, but early signs have been promising. A
study of Kickstarter campaigns found that “over 90% of successful
projects remained as ongoing ventures for 1–4 years after their campaign,
almost a third reported annual revenues of over $100,000 a year since the
campaign, and successful projects increased their staffing by 2.2
employees on average.”6 Another, more recent survey found that “[o]f the
fifty highest funded projects on Kickstarter, . . . [forty-five] have turned

1. MASSOLUTION, 2013CF THE CROWDFUNDING INDUSTRY REPORT (2013). This
figure includes reward-based, donation-based, debt-based, and equity-based
crowdfunding.
2. Michael S. Fischer, Crowdfunding Makes Rapid Gains with Accredited
Investors, THINKADVISOR (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2015/03/30/
crowdfunding-makes-rapid-gains-with-accredited-inv [https://perma.cc/HKP7-2W6J].
3. Zachary Zagger, Real Estate Crowdfunding to Top $2.5B in 2015, Report Says,
LAW360 (Mar. 3, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/624658/realestate-crowdfunding-to-top-2-5b-in-2015-report-says [https://perma.cc/J77G-7E6B].
4. Katherine Noyes, Why Investors Are Pouring Millions into Crowdfunding,
FORTUNE (Apr. 17, 2014, 6:47 PM), https://fortune.com/2014/04/17/why-investors-arepouring-millions-into-crowdfunding [https://perma.cc/3KY6-RWHG].
5. See infra Section I.C.
6. Gary Bruton et al., New Financial Alternatives in Seeding Entrepreneurship:
Microfinance, Crowdfunding, and Peer-to-Peer Innovations, 39 ENTREPRENEURSHIP
THEORY & PRAC. 9, 15 (2015) (citing Mollick, After the Campaign: Outcomes of
Crowdfunding (UNC Kenan-Flagler, Research Paper No. 2376997, 2014),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2376997 [https://perma.cc/Q4AN-BKT2]).
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into ongoing entrepreneurial firms.”7 Thus, the early evidence seems to
suggest that crowdfunding platforms are indeed capable of spawning
viable businesses. Even more promising is a recent success story from the
United Kingdom’s equity crowdfunding scene8:
In October of 2012, a pharmaceutical development company called
Antabio, which had raised early stage funding on WiSeed, became the
first company to reach an important milestone in the development of
equity crowdfunding—over two hundred crowd investors received a
profitable return in an exit event. In fact, not only did the investors
make a return, some made as much as 70% on their initial investment
when a larger pharmaceutical development company bought out all of
Antabio’s existing shares.9

Current experience with crowdfunding indicates that those seeking funds
are, for the most part, serious about what they are doing: roughly 25% of
hardware projects on Kickstarter deliver on time, which is in line with the
on-time performance rates of projects backed by more traditional funding
sources.10 Experiments with allowing intrastate equity crowdfunding in
several Midwestern states also seem to indicate that fraud is not
rampant.11
7. Ethan Mollick, Swept Away by the Crowd? Crowdfunding, Venture Capital, and
the Selection of Entrepreneurs 10 (Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania,
Working Paper, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2239204
[https://perma.cc/T5H9-REJU].
8. Note that the United Kingdom’s market is a dramatically different market from
that of the United States, and thus may not be a perfect indicator of how United States
crowdfunding campaigns will fare. Note also that given the nascency of the
crowdfunding market, one should be hesitant to generalize too readily from the small
number of samples we have to work with at the current time.
9. Ross S. Weinstein, Crowdfunding in the U.S. and Abroad: What to Expect When
You’re Expecting, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 427, 446 (2013).
10. Can Crowdfunding Democratize Access to Capital?, INNOVATION@WORK BLOG
(Jun. 2, 2014), https://executive.mit.edu/blog/can-crowdfunding-democratize-access-tocapital [https://perma.cc/H3ND-BATC].
11. Steven Davidoff Solomon, S.E.C.’s Delay on Crowdfunding May Just Save It,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 18, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/18/s-ec-s-delay-on-crowdfunding-may-just-save-it-2/ [https://perma.cc/KX6M-43PP]. These
early experiments are being somewhat contradicted by recent developments under the
JOBS Act. See, e.g., Martin O’Sullivan, FINRA Bars Crowdfunding Portal in 1st JOBS
Act Settlement, LAW360 (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/870969/finrabars-crowdfunding-portal-in-1st-jobs-act-settlement [https://perma.cc/BV68-CCYT].
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With this in mind, many prominent voices have called for relaxed
regulations on capital gathering by start-ups. Steve Case, for example, has
famously called for giving unaccredited investors greater ability to invest
by noting that “[i]t seems a little crazy to me that you have to be an
accredited investor to invest in a company, but you can go to Las Vegas
and lose $10,000 at the table in an hour and you don’t have to be an
accredited gambler to do that.” 12 Others note that regulators’ natural
aversion to letting start-ups freely raise capital has often worked to the
detriment of investors. Sam Guzik, an attorney practitioner who
frequently writes on issues in this field, is fond of pointing out that the
state of Massachusetts blocked its residents from participating in Apple’s
1980 initial public offering (“IPO”) because the investment opportunity
failed merit review, thereby preventing those residents from holding a
piece of what later became the most valuable public company in the
world.13
But for all its promise, opening up the largely unexplored frontier of
equity crowdfunding brings some massive risks. Several prominent
commentators question whether the general public can properly vet
investment opportunities and screen out fraudulent company listings,14
and it is far from clear that unaccredited investors will be able to diversify
sufficiently to avoid devastating losses. Despite these very real risks,
Regulation A+ has been placed in the Code of Federal Regulations and is
now in effect. This Article examines the potential consequences of its
adoption, critiques the two primary rationales for the regulation in light
of those consequences, and offers a normative framework that ought to
guide the SEC’s enforcement going forward.15 Analysis will proceed in
four parts. Part I discusses the history of and impetus for Regulation A+.
Part II discusses the merits of the “democratizing access to capital”
12. Scott Edward Walker, Crowdfunding Bill Stuck in the Senate, FORBES (Jan. 13,
2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottedwardwalker/2012/01/13/crowdfunding-billstuck-in-the-senate/2 [https://perma.cc/6S6W-EA4H].
13. Sam Guzik, Regulation A+ Offerings—A New Era at the SEC, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 15, 2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2014/01/15/regulation-a-offerings-a-new-era-at-the-sec [https://perma.cc/5U8V-XPUJ].
14. See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks
and the Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned
on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735 (2012).
15. While the scope of this Article is limited to discussing Regulation A+, to the
extent Regulation Crowdfunding (issued under Title III of the JOBS Act) has similar
aims, the same critiques can be leveled against it and the same prescriptions apply.

160

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXII

rationale for Regulation A+. Part III examines the merits of the “IPO
facilitation” rationale for Regulation A+. Part IV evaluates Regulation A+
holistically in light of its dual goals and makes certain suggestions in
terms of enforcement.
I. HISTORY AND IMPETUS FOR REGULATION A+
A. THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF SMALL FIRMS
In 2011, at least three bills were introduced that sought to increase
access to capital for entrepreneurs. 16 All three bills were motivated
(ostensibly) by a desire to spur economic growth, and were influenced by
the pervasive notion that start-ups hold the key to such growth.17 And
indeed, there is ample evidence (approaching the problem from multiple
perspectives) to support the idea that start-ups are key drivers of economic
prosperity.
Consider the issue of reducing unemployment. Despite their small
size, new businesses are responsible for the bulk of job creation.
According to a report by the Kauffman Foundation, “existing firms are
net job destroyers, losing 1 million jobs net combined per year. By
contrast, in their first year, new firms add an average of 3 million jobs.”18
And this job creation seems to be subject to a multiplier effect: each new
high-tech job is estimated to create 4.3 additional non-high-tech jobs in a
given region.19 The employment boost provided by start-ups seems to be
relatively resilient compared to other job sources: “during recessionary
years, job creation at startups remains stable, while net job losses at

16.
17.
18.

Walker, supra note 12.
Id.
TIM KANE, EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUND., THE IMPORTANCE OF STARTUPS
IN JOB CREATION AND JOB DESTRUCTION (2010), https://www.kauffman.org/what-wedo/research/firm-formation-and-growth-series/the-importance-of-startups-in-job-creatio
n-and-job-destruction [https://perma.cc/FLE3-3S9U].
19. IAN HATHAWAY, Bay Area Council Econ. Inst., TECHNOLOGY WORKS: HIGHTECH EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES (2012). See generally Enrico
Moretti, Local Multipliers, 100 AM. ECON. REV: PAPERS & PROC. 1 (2010). For a similar
analysis reaching similar results in Europe, see Marten Goos et al., High Technology
Employment in the European Union (Vives, Discussion Paper, 2013), https://feb.kuleuv
en.be/VIVES/Onderzoek/discussionpapers/DP/dp2013/final-20131223-3rd.pdf [https://
perma.cc/96UV-EGWX].
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existing firms are highly sensitive to the business cycle.” 20 Similarly,
“[p]atterns of job growth at startups and existing firms are both procyclical, although existing firms have much more cyclical variance.”21
New firms backed by venture capitalists are especially adept at
producing jobs. In fact, in 2010, there were 11.9 million venture-backed
jobs in the United States, comprising 11% of jobs in the private sector22—
this, despite annual venture capital investment amounting to less than
0.2% of GDP.23 These jobs are also slightly more resilient than average:
while the 2008 financial crisis caused a drop in private-sector
employment of 2.6% from 2008 to 2010, “venture-backed company
employment fell by only 2.0 percent—23 percent less than the overall
decline.”24 Statistics on angel investments paint a similar picture: “by one
estimate, in the first half of 2013 alone, angels invested approximately
$9.7 billion in over 28,000 ventures, with over 111,000 new jobs created
as a result of these investments.”25
Interestingly, research suggests that “92% of job growth for young
companies occurs after an initial public offering.” 26 The Kauffman
Foundation estimates that if companies had gone public in the first decade
of the twenty-first century at the same rate they did between 1980 and
2000, an additional 1.881 million jobs would have been created over that
20.
21.
22.

KANE, supra note 18.
Id.
NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, VENTURE IMPACT: THE ECONOMIC
IMPORTANCE OF VENTURE CAPITAL-BACKED COMPANIES TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 3 (6th
ed. 2011), https://www.jumpstartnetwork.org/sitecore/content/jumpstartinc/home/results
/dl/~/media/JumpStartInc/Images/Results-Page/2011-NVCA-VentureImpactReport.as
hx [https://perma.cc/L3UT-HJUN].
23. Id. at 2.
24. Id. at 8.
25. Keith Higgins, The Changing Regulatory Landscape for Angel Investing, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 21, 2014), https://blogs.law.harvard.
edu/corpgov/2014/04/21/the-changing-regulatory-landscape-for-angel-investing/ [https:
//perma.cc/7JR2-FJR2] (citing JEFFREY SOHL, CTR. FOR VENTURE RESEARCH, THE
ANGEL INVESTOR MARKET IN Q1Q2 2013: A SUSTAINABLE GROWTH CONTINUES (2013),
https://paulcollege.unh.edu/sites/paulcollege.unh.edu/files/Q1Q2%202013%20Analysis
%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UKV-W3W4]).
26. NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, supra note 22, at 4. This figure is questioned
in MARTIN KENNEY, DONALD PATTON & JAY R. RITTER, EWING MARION KAUFFMAN
FOUND., POST-IPO EMPLOYMENT AND REVENUE GROWTH FOR U.S. IPOS, JUNE 19962010 (2012), https://www.kauffman.org/what-we-do/research/2012/05/postipo-employ
ment-and-revenue-growth-for-us-ipos-june-19962010 [https://perma.cc/DB69-NTGW],
which considers the actual number to be something closer to 62%.
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decade. 27 Given those staggering figures, it is easy to understand why
Congress and the SEC have made it a priority to create a smoother “onramp” for emerging growth companies,28 attempting to offer start-ups a
cheaper, easier “mini-IPO” under Regulation A.29
GDP figures paint a similar picture regarding the importance of new
firms. According to the National Venture Capital Association, “for every
dollar of venture capital invested from 1970 to 2010, $6.27 of revenue
was generated in 2010.”30 In fact, revenue from venture capital-backed
companies currently comprises roughly 21% of U.S. GDP.31 Similarly, a
report from Deutsche Bank finds that “[a]n increase in VC investments of
0.1% of GDP is statistically associated with an increase in real GDP
growth of .30pp. A similar increase in seed and startup investments is
associated with an increase of as much as .96pp.”32
On a more qualitative level, start-ups seem to improve the flow of
tacit information among firms in a given region, thereby contributing
greatly to a region’s competitiveness. 33 Small firms lead to more
knowledge dissemination and thus are more impactful to the local
economy, while “[l]arge firms incorporate many of the services within
their own operations because they can achieve scale economies within the

27. KENNEY ET AL., supra note 26. Query, however, whether the drop in IPOs has a
direct causal effect on employment figures, or whether employment figures and IPO
figures are both driven by some third, common cause.
28. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, Title I, 126 Stat.
306, 307-13 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)).
29. See, e.g., Victoria Silchenko, Fifty Shades of White: Raising Equity from the
Public by Start-ups, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com
/victoria-silchenko/fifty-shades-of-white-rai_b_6966268.html [https://perma.cc/88WNGEH5] (characterizing the regulation as creating a “mini-IPO” mechanism).
30. NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, supra note 22, at 2.
31. Id.
32. THOMAS MEYER, Deutsche Bank Research, VENTURE CAPITAL ADDS ECONOMIC
SPICE 5 (2010), https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PR
OD0000000000262487.PDF [https://perma.cc/EHC4-FY8P]. The report cautions,
however, that causality likely runs both ways. Id. at 5. The author does find that a
Granger-causality test of the U.S. data indicated that U.S. venture capital investment
does, in fact, cause real-GDP growth. Id. at 4.
33. Matthew A. Zook, The Knowledge Brokers: Venture Capitalists, Tacit
Knowledge and Regional Development, 28 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 621, 624
(2004)).
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firm.” 34 In other words, large firms are more fully integrated and less
reliant on outside suppliers, such that “dollar for dollar, their business is
less of a stimulus” because it generates less local knowledge
dissemination than that of smaller firms.35
Thus, it is clear that new firms are integral to the success of the U.S.
economy, regardless of whether success is measured in terms of
employment rate, GDP, or other less easily quantifiable measures, such
as the rate of knowledge dissemination.
B. REGULATION A AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS
Regulation A+ updates Regulation A, an exemption that was meant
to be attractive for small issuers. Compared to full SEC registration, the
Regulation A exemption offered numerous benefits including (but not
limited to) the following:
(i) reduced disclosures to investors . . . including the ability to use
“reviewed” financial statements instead of audited financial
statements, . . . [(ii)] the ability to “test the waters” prior to incurring
significant upfront costs such as filing an offering memorandum with
the SEC, [(iii)] the ability of an investor to receive free trading shares
upon their issuance, and (iv) the absence of post-offering reporting
requirements unless and until a company meets the threshold reporting
requirements applicable to all companies under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.36

However, Regulation A proved to be highly unpopular. From 1997 to
2011, the number of filings per year began at a mere 116 and fell to 19.37
Actual use of the exemption is even lower; in fact, in 2011, only one of
the nineteen filings ultimately resulted in an offering qualified by
Regulation A.38 As a result, Regulation A filings are currently dwarfed by
both Regulation D offerings (8194 in 2011) and registered IPOs (312 in
2011).39 This low utilization is generally attributed to the high cost of

34. Id. at 624 (citing Chinitz, Contrasts in Agglomeration: New York and Pittsburgh,
51 AM. ECON. REV. 279, 288 (1961)).
35. Id.
36. Guzik, supra note 13.
37. U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION:
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS 8-9 (2012).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 10-11.
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conducting a Regulation A offering compared to the amount that can be
raised.40 The bulk of the cost arises from the need to comply with blue sky
laws of each state where the offering is conducted,41 which can require
substantial time and money.42 The most troublesome blue sky laws are
those involving “merit review,” 43 which can lead to incidents like
Massachusetts’ infamous decision to pull the plug on Apple’s 1980 IPO.
C. REGULATION A+ TO THE RESCUE
Recognizing the failure of Regulation A to offer meaningful support
to small issuers, Congress elected to update the regulation in Title IV of
the JOBS Act. 44 This enhanced form of Regulation A is commonly
referred to as “Regulation A+.” The SEC, working under the mandate of
Congress, proposed rules for Regulation A+ on December 18, 2013.45 The
final Regulation A+ rules were announced on March 25, 2015 with slight
variations from their proposed form. Under the final rules, the exemption
is available in two tiers, which work as follows:
 The Tier 1 exemption is available only to those who raise $20
million or less. 46 It requires both SEC and state-level review,
along with the associated fees.47 Issuers are, by default, required
only to have their financials reviewed for registration, not audited,

40.
41.
42.

Guzik, supra note 13.
Id. (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 37).
Id.; see also David Drake, Crowdfunding Industry Set to Explode as SEC
Approves Regulation A+, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 27, 2015), https://www.huffington
post.com/david-drake/crowdfunding-industry-set_b_6953600.html [https://perma.cc/3A
5L-USWR].
43. Guzik, supra note 13.
44. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, Title IV, 126 Stat.
306, 323-25 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c-77d, 77r (2012)).
45. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposed Rules to Increase Access
to Capital for Smaller Companies (Dec. 18, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRele
ase/Detail/PressRelease/1370540518165 [https://perma.cc/QWQ3-RK25].
46. David Drake, Why the New Regulation A+ Rules Will Rock the Crowdfunding
World, HEDGECO.NET (Mar. 29, 2015), https://www.hedgeco.net/blogs/2015/03/29/why
-the-new-regulation-a-rules-will-rock-the-crowdfunding-world-by-david-drake/ [https://
perma.cc/KH4N-6WLV].
47. Id.
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although audited financials are required to be disclosed if they are
already in existence.48
 The Tier 2 exemption, in contrast, is available for raises of up to
$50 million.49 Tier 2 requires SEC review but no state blue-sky
review, in essence pre-empting state-level review.50 Issuers must
disclose audited financials51 and must submit to an annual audit
on a going-forward basis. This exemption also requires the use of
a registered transfer agent.52
Both tiers create unrestricted securities, 53 allow participation by
unaccredited investors, and are not available for certain “bad actors” or
for reporting companies.54 In certain circumstances, Tier 2 offerings are
exempt from the registration requirements of Section 12(g) of the
Securities Exchange Act.55
Practitioners have argued that compared to Rule 506(c) offerings,56
Regulation A+ has both pros and cons that are, on balance, likely to make
it a somewhat attractive option for issuers. On the plus side, Regulation
A+ allows for solicitation of unaccredited investors, creates a tradable
48. Id.; see also KATHERINE K. DELUCA ET AL., A GUIDE TO REGULATION A+ 11
(2015), https://media.mcguirewoods.com/publications/2015/White-Paper-on-Regulation
-Aplus.pdf [https://perma.cc/35Y6-BM4W].
49. Drake, supra note 46.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Alon Y. Kapen, SEC Adopts Final Reg A+ Rules for Mini Public Offerings of up
to $50 Million Without Registration, N.Y. VENTURE HUB (Mar. 26, 2015),
https://www.nyventurehub.com/2015/03/26/sec-adopts-final-reg-a-rules-for-mini-publi
c-offerings-of-up-to-50-million-without-registration/ [https://perma.cc/L3UH-YUFJ].
54. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules to Facilitate Smaller
Companies’ Access to Capital (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/
2015-49.html [https://perma.cc/4BUH-YAY8].
55. Dorothee Fisher-Appelt and Godric C. Shoesmith, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, SEC
Adopts Regulation A+: Two New Alternatives for Exempt Capital Raises 4 (2015).
56. By way of background, Rule 506(c) is an exemption from the registration
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, which allows an issuer to engage in a general
solicitation without having to register the securities being sold, so long as the issuer limits
participation to accredited investors only and takes certain concrete steps to verify the
accredited status of each participant. See generally U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Fast
Answers: Rule 506 of Regulation D, SEC (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/fastanswers/answers-rule506htm.html [https://perma.cc/3U6G-AXDY]. Rule 506(c), unlike
some of the other exemptions from the ’33 Act, does not place a limit on the size of the
offering. Id.
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security, and has relatively high offering limits (especially under Tier 2).57
Its downsides include the considerable time it can take to launch a
Regulation A+ offering (SEC review being a bottleneck) and the
increased legal fees and accounting costs compared to Regulation D
private placements (because of the fees associated with both the initial
registration and the ongoing reporting obligations).58
On its face, Regulation A+ promises to change the risk capital
landscape in two ways: (1) by addressing inequitable distributions of risk
capital, thereby “democratizing” access to capital, and (2) by creating a
“mini-IPO” process less burdensome than full IPOs, thereby affording
increased access to public markets for companies too small to afford the
expense of the extensive registration and disclosure involved in
conducting a full IPO. Viewed critically, however, both rationales contain
serious flaws which largely undermine the arguments for adopting
Regulation A+. The two rationales will be discussed in turn.
II. THE “DEMOCRATIZING ACCESS TO CAPITAL” RATIONALE—DOES
IT HOLD UP?
A. IS THERE A GENERAL UNDERSUPPLY OF RISK CAPITAL?
Many entrepreneurs will argue that a huge barrier to their success is
the fact that too few investors are willing to invest in risky, early-stage
ventures. For example, a 2014 survey found that the second most common
perceived reason for failure among unsuccessful start-ups was that they
“[r]an out of cash.”59 Similarly, there is no shortage of news articles from
various regions claiming that a severe lack of capital in the area is holding
back the local start-up community (and, by extension, the local
economy).60
57.
58.
59.

Drake, supra note 46.
Id.
Erin Griffin, Why Startups Fail, According to Their Founders, FORTUNE (Sept.
25, 2014, 3:00 PM), https://fortune.com/2014/09/25/why-startups-fail-according-to-their
-founders/ [https://perma.cc/VSB5-9LLR]. The most commonly perceived reason was
“the lack of a market need.” Id.
60. See, e.g., Chuck Soder, Local Startups Are Stalled by Lack of Capital, CRAIN’S
CLEVELAND BUS. (Apr. 20, 2014), https://www.crainscleveland.com/article/20140420/S
UB1/140419790/local-startups-are-stalled-by-lack-of-capital [https://perma.cc/5688-9
B67].
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However, those on the other side of the table paint a very different
picture. A common refrain among venture capitalists is that “[t]here’s still
too much money . . . chasing too few deals.”61 The consensus seems to be
that the existing private placement market is already a deep source of
funding, and those entrepreneurs who feel that there is an undersupply of
capital are probably overestimating the number of viable ventures. 62
Venture capitalists also contend that while funding levels have remained
relatively constant over time (albeit with some cyclical variance), the
amount of capital needed to launch a company has decreased dramatically
in recent years due to cloud computing, lower software development
costs, and a variety of other advancements.63
While the literature is somewhat conflicting, the bulk of the
empirical evidence gathered so far seems to indicate that venture capital
is not, in general, undersupplied. Perhaps the starkest indicator of this is
the fact that venture capital returns during the 2000s were abysmal. If
venture capital, as an asset class, were undersupplied, one would expect
the “price” of acquiring venture capital to be artificially high and returns
on venture capital investments to be artificially high as a result (on a riskadjusted basis). Yet an infamous Kauffman Foundation report from 2009
suggests that, on average, venture capital funds failed to outperform the
Russell 2000 Index from 1997 to 2009.64 In fact, more than half of the

61. E.g., Carmel DeAmicis, Bill Draper: Why Venture Returns Have Fallen
Dramatically and Will Likely Stay That Way, PANDODAILY (June 24, 2013), https://pando
.com/2013/06/24/venture-capitalist-bill-draper-takes-the-long-view-of-history-2/ [https:
//perma.cc/FAK8-FMMS].
62. See, e.g., id.; Sarah Max, Venture Capital Is Looking for Ways to Outrun the
Herd, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 10, 2014, 12:31 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2014/12/10/venture-capital-is-looking-for-ways-to-outrun-the-herd/ [https://perma.cc/G
VF6-NVZN].
63. See, e.g., Deborah Gage, Which Start-Ups Should Not Raise Venture Capital?,
WALL ST. J.: VENTURE CAP. DISPATCH (Apr. 3, 2012, 4:34 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/ve
nturecapital/2012/04/03/which-start-ups-should-not-raise-venture-capital/ [https://perma
.cc/HYG5-TCBL] (recapping a discussion among a panel of investors and entrepreneurs
who felt that “[w]ith Amazon Web Services and a myriad of other free or low-cost
technologies, start-ups are cheaper than ever to start”). This may be more true for the
software industry than other industries, but even for non-software companies a robust
ecosystem has developed, which lowers costs appreciably.
64. DIANE MULCAHY ET AL., EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUND., WE HAVE MET
THE ENEMY, AND HE IS US 3 (2012), https://www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/
research%20reports%20and%20covers/2012/05/we_have_met_the_enemy_and_he_is_
us.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZB4A-HKQU].
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venture capital firms surveyed in the report failed to even return investor
capital (after fees) during the period from 1989 to 2003—suggesting that,
if anything, venture capital is probably being oversupplied at the moment,
not undersupplied.65
Evidence from European markets conflicts with this picture
somewhat, but not entirely. A survey conducted of small enterprise
financing data in the United Kingdom found that “small business growth
is constrained by a lack of working capital,”66 even after controlling for a
number of variables related to business and owner characteristics.
Another study found that “European [technology companies] finance new
investments by relying primarily on internal funds. There seems to be a
wedge between the cost of internal and outside finance, including debt
and external equity. Such a wedge is likely due to capital market failures
induced by asymmetric information.”67 It is important to note, however,
that two factors limit the applicability of these studies. First, the United
Kingdom does not have as robust a private capital market as the United
States, so one must be careful about generalizing too much from data from
the United Kingdom. Second, given the evidence that the observed market
failure is rooted in information asymmetry, the correct way to address it
would be by facilitating quality disclosures, rather than trying to increase
the supply of capital.
In short, the evidence is not entirely consistent, but the most
convincing signs indicate that there is probably not a nationwide—or
global—shortage of startup capital.
B. IS THERE A REGIONAL EQUITY GAP?
Even if there is no nationwide undersupply of capital, it is possible
that capital might be undersupplied in some regions and overabundant in
others, creating a “regional equity gap” to the detriment of entrepreneurs
in the underserved regions. Indeed, there is evidence that venture capital
65.
66.

Id. at 4.
Stuart Fraser et al., What Do We Know About Entrepreneurial Finance and Its
Relationship with Growth?, 33 INT’L SMALL BUS. J. 70, 78 (2015) (citing STUART
FRASER, ACCESS TO FINANCE FOR CREATIVE INDUSTRY BUSINESSES (2011), https://www.
bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/enterprise/docs/a/11-898-access-to-finance-for-creative-indust
ry-businesses [https://perma.cc/AX5X-8AFY]).
67. Valérie Revest & Alessandro Sapio, Financing Technology-Based Small Firms
in Europe: What Do We Know?, 39 SMALL BUS. ECON. 179, 198 (2012).
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investments tend to flow disproportionately to a small number of tech
“clusters.”68 If there is a regional equity gap, crowdfunding seems to hold
great promise to remedy it, since “80% of [crowd]funding comes from
people more than 3,000 miles away from the startup’s/fund seeker’s
physical location.”69 But to understand whether there is a regional equity
gap at all, we must first understand why venture capital investments are
so heavily clustered.
1. Venture Capitalist and Angel Investment Criteria
Both venture capitalists and angel investors exhibit a tendency to
invest disproportionately high amounts of capital in certain key regions.70
A series of papers by Florida and Kenney in the early 1990s, for example,
found that venture capital investments primarily flowed into established
high-tech centers such as Silicon Valley and Boston’s Route 128.71 They
further found that technology hubs attract venture capitalists not only
from the surrounding, local regions, but also from financial centers like
New York and Chicago.72 While it might be expected that the clustering
of venture capital investment would decline over time, subsequent studies
have found just the opposite.73 This effect has become so pronounced that
today, despite talk of globalization, “the average distance between a lead
VC and their investment is 70 miles.”74 This is very much a conscious
decision on the part of investors—surveys find that somewhere between
25% and 72% of angel investors will intentionally limit their investing to
within fifty miles of home.75
68. See, e.g., Richard L. Florida & Martin Kenney, Venture Capital, HighTechnology and Regional Development, 22 REGIONAL STUD. 33, 33 (1988).
69. Can Crowdfunding Democratize Access to Capital?, supra note 10.
70. Richard Florida & Donald F. Smith, Jr., Venture Capital Formation, Investment,
and Regional Industrialization, 83 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 434, 436 (1991)
(citations omitted).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Colin Mason, VC: A Geographical Perspective, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON
VENTURE CAPITAL 86, 102 (Hans Landstrom ed., 2007).
74. Olav Sorenson & Toby E. Stuart, Bringing the Context Back In: Settings and the
Search for Syndicate Partners in Venture Capital Investment Networks, 53 ADMIN. SCI.
Q. 266 (2008); Mollick, supra note 7, at 8 (citation omitted).
75. Mason, supra note 73, at 90–91 (citing PATRICK COVENEY & KARL MOORE,
BUSINESS ANGELS: SECURING START-UP FINANCE (1997); ROBERT J. GASTON, FINDING
PRIVATE VENTURE CAPITAL FOR YOUR FIRM: A COMPLETE GUIDE (1989); Stuart Paul et
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One commonly cited reason for this is a practical one: investors
prefer to invest in companies that are physically close so that they do not
have to travel far to work with their portfolio companies. 76 Yet a
preference for avoiding long travel surely does not tell the whole story. A
study of Germany’s venture capital industry found that the distance of the
portfolio company was only a minor consideration in deciding when to
invest, and that the interviewed investors generally agreed that the acute
undersupply of good deals required them to be relatively geography
agnostic.77
A more nuanced view suggests that this effect arises, in part, because
of the “absence of publicly available information on new and young
businesses.” 78 This view posits that their “unproven business models,
untested management teams, new technologies and inchoate markets” are
all significant sources of risk and uncertainty for investors. 79 Venture
capitalists attempt to minimize this risk by sharing information with
“other investors, consultants, accountants and a wide range of other
actors” 80 —but information sharing does not come easily. For proper
information sharing, participants need mutual trust, which can only be
established over time and through ongoing communication; thus, the
“nature of this information flow tends to [be] personal and informal and

al., The Operation of the Informal Venture Capital Market in Scotland, 5 VENTURE CAP.
313 (2003); Dominique M. Short & Allan L. Riding, Informal Investors in the OttawaCarleton Region: Experiences and Expectations, 1 ENTREPRENEURSHIP & REGIONAL
DEV. 99 (1989)). Note that one 1989 survey of U.S. angels found that 72% wished to
invest within fifty miles of home and only 7% had no geographic preferences. GASTON,
supra.
76. See, e.g., Can Crowdfunding Democratize Access to Capital?, supra note 10
(“According to Professor Ajay Agrawal of the University of Toronto, ‘The angel level of
finance is traditionally very local and liquid. The various [crowdfunding] platforms make
it more impactful for both investors and founders.’”).
77. Michael Fritsch & Dirk Schilder, Does Venture Capital Investment Really
Require Spatial Proximity? An Empirical Investigation (Freiberg, Working Paper No.
07/2006, 2006), https://tu-freiberg.de/sites/default/files/media/fakultaet-6-3307/fileadmi
n/Arbeitspapiere/2006/fritsch_7_2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q24U-MDC6]. The authors
note that Germany may be a unique case because most cities in Europe are accessible
from every other city by a two-hour flight. Id.
78. Mason, supra note 73, at 103.
79. Id. (citing Olav Sorenson & Toby E. Stuart, Syndication Networks and the
Spatial Distribution of Venture Capital Investments, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1546 (2001)).
80. Id.
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therefore hard to conduct over distance.”81 Sticking to local investments
is thus one way venture capitalists can “reduce uncertainty, compensate
for ambiguous information and thereby [minimize] risk.”82
This reliance on personal and professional relationships continues
throughout every stage of the investment—from the initial investment
decisions to the post-investment monitoring stage. 83 Post-investment,
venture capitalists monitor their portfolio companies by “taking a seat on
the board of directors, setting goals and metrics for the companies to meet
and . . . [providing] advice and mentoring.”84 In some cases, they may
directly manage the company (e.g., if the business is led by a young
scientist). 85 The proximity of the venture capitalist to the company
influences the efficacy of these post-investment activities in three ways:
(1) venture capitalists can work more closely with local companies, (2)
venture capitalists can provide more relevant referrals and contacts to
nearby companies, and (3) “unplanned encounters” and informal
informational flow is stronger if the venture capitalist and company are
physically closer.86 Thus, venture capitalists who take seriously the goal
of maximizing investment returns will naturally prefer to invest in startups that are closer to them.
To be sure, there are likely some factors that encourage localized
venture capital-funding and that are not associated with greater returns.
For example, “behavioral reasons may also contribute to [investors’]
preference for local investments because [local investments] can
potentially allow them to maintain and strengthen local social and family
ties more effectively than distant transactions.”87 To the extent that such
considerations drive investment decisions, crowdfunding may be able to
offer an improvement by routing money to the most meritorious
companies, rather than to companies that happen to offer potential
personal benefits for local venture capitalists. However, there is little
81.
82.

Id.
Id. (citing Florida & Kenney, supra note 68; Florida & Smith, Jr., supra note

70).
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id. at 105.
Id. (citing MATTHEW ZOOK, THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE INTERNET INDUSTRY
(2005); Walter W. Powell et al., The Spatial Clustering of Science and Capital:
Accounting for Biotech Firm-Venture Capital Relationships, 36 REGIONAL STUD. 291
(2002)).
86. Id. (citing Powell et al., supra note 85).
87. Christos Kolympirisa & Nicholas Kalaitzandonakes, The Geographic Extent of
Venture Capital Externalities on Innovation, 15 VENTURE CAP. 199, 200 (2013).
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evidence to suggest that personal perquisites play anything more than a
minor role in venture capitalists’ decision-making.
The above should not be taken to mean that the supply of venture
capital necessarily constrains the flow of venture capital. To the contrary,
the supply of venture capital is more than capable of flowing to the best
opportunities through the mechanism of investment syndication. As long
as there is at least one investor geographically close to the opportunity
and willing to serve as the “lead investor” (i.e., the investor responsible
for monitoring the investment), other investors from distant locales can
participate without losing the benefit of local monitoring and mentorship.
This process of syndication has led to the somewhat paradoxical situation
that “[o]n the one hand, VC is highly mobile and on the other, it is very
concentrated”88: regardless of the source of the capital, investments tend
to occur near “concentrations of high-technology businesses and
employment and VC coinvestment.”89 Thus, the supply and demand of
venture capital appear to be largely geographically decoupled, which
“contradicts the underlying premise upon which much public policy in
this area rests, viz., that ‘gaps’ in the [venture capital] supply are a major
reason for the lack of high-technology development in certain places.”90
In short, as long as a given market has enough local venture
capitalists to enable a pipeline of incoming syndicated investments, policy
makers should not worry about the absolute supply of local venture capital
(in dollar terms). Accordingly, initiatives that attempt to spur local growth
and development by providing funds for venture capital investment have
historically been unsuccessful. Historical data from cities as varied as
Silicon Valley, Ottawa, Washington, D.C., and Cambridge all indicate
that “venture capital lags rather than leads the emergence of
entrepreneurial activity.”91 In the case of Ottawa, “[a] survey of high tech
start-ups founded since 1965 . . . found that few had raised external

88.
89.
90.
91.

Florida & Smith, Jr., supra note 70, at 438.
Id. at 448.
Id.
Mason, supra note 73, at 109. The author notes that while venture capital is not
needed to create a center of entrepreneurial activity, “venture capital is needed for the
sustained growth and development of a cluster: without venture capital a cluster is likely
to stagnate or decline.” Id.
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finance, none had raised venture capital and the most important source of
funding was the personal savings of their founders.”92
Thus, it is far from clear that there is a true regional equity gap. The
perceived regional gap is likely just a result of certain regions being better
or worse for entrepreneurs. Pouring money into traditionally underserved
regions may be a waste—especially if that money does not come with
monitoring, mentorship, advice, new networks of contacts, and all the
other myriad benefits that good venture capitalists offer. Section II.B.ii
below provides further support for that reading of the data by examining
various explanations for why Silicon Valley has outperformed other
similar regions.
2. Regional Differences that May Explain Venture Capital Clustering
Given the theoretical potential for venture capital to flow to wherever
it will earn the greatest returns, the obvious implication is that venture
capital clustering occurs because certain regions simply offer better
prospects for entrepreneurial ventures. And indeed, there is good
evidence that this is the case. This section will explore that notion by first
examining Silicon Valley as a region and then comparing it to other
regions.
The modern Silicon Valley emerged sometime in the second half of
the twentieth century. In the view of Jerome Engel, “three components—
universities, government, and entrepreneurs—played key historic roles in
the transformation of this small agricultural valley into the powerhouse of
invention and business creation” that it is today. 93 For example, the
Stanford Industrial Park (now Stanford Research Park), which was
created in 1951 on university-owned land, now hosts more than 150
companies with over 23,000 employees. 94 Government involvement
began in earnest immediately prior to World War II and continued
through the Cold War, with “military research fund[ing] engineering
efforts in universities . . . , national government laboratories . . . , and
private firms in Silicon Valley.”95 As one researcher notes, “[t]his long92. Id. at 111 (citing G.P.F. Steed & L.J. Nichol, Entrepreneurs, Incubators and
Indigenous Regional Development: Ottawa’s Experience (1985) (unpublished
manuscript)).
93. Jerome S. Engel, Global Clusters of Innovation: Lessons from Silicon Valley, 57
CAL. MGMT. REV. 36, 39 (2015).
94. Id.
95. Id. Hewlett Packard, for example, grew out of military contracts.
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term governmental spending on military weapons and aerospace R&D in
the Valley can be considered as a crucial catalyst for the subsequent
emergence of this techno-centric innovation cluster.”96
Silicon Valley also houses a uniquely robust class of “professional
entrepreneurs,”97 which some speculate has its origins in the California
Gold Rush.98 Regardless of the origin of the class, it is clear that those
professionals are now “core actors that drive Silicon Valley’s continuous
self-reinvention with new industries and technologies.”99
In terms of concrete resources, Silicon Valley has numerous venture
capital funds, mature corporations (i.e., potential partners), industrial
research centers, and professional service providers (including lawyers,
accountants, design professionals, recruiting firms, investment bankers,
incubators, and accelerators) “who not only provide[] tailored
professional services, but also are willing to discount or defer fees, often
in exchange for a small share in the venture’s eventual returns.”100 On a
more qualitative level, Silicon Valley has mobility of resources, respect
for entrepreneurial process, global strategic perspective, and an alignment
of interests that permits companies to incentivize employees properly and
allows innovators to collaborate with establishments together in a “winwin challenge to displace incumbents.” 101 Finally, a comparison of
Silicon Valley with other regions suggests that yet another key
differentiator is Silicon Valley’s large talent pool and high labor
velocity.102
In contrast to those in Silicon Valley, small firms in peripheral areas
are characterized by lower levels of innovation.103 Within those regions,
the level of innovation is closely related to “the degree to which firms are

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 40.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 43-45.
Alan Hyde, Silicon Valley’s High-Velocity Labor Market, 11 J. APPLIED CORP.
FIN. 28 (1998).
103. Edward J. Malecki, Entrepreneurship in Regional and Local Development, 16
INT’L REGIONAL SCI. REV. 119, 131 (1993) (citing E.J. Malecki & P. Nijekamp,
Technology and Regional Development: Some Thoughts on Policy, 6 ENV’T & PLAN. C:
GOV’T & POL’Y 383 (1988)).

2017]

THE RIGHT DEED FOR THE WRONG REASON

175

tied to local networks of suppliers and to external markets.” 104 These
regions are generally poor environments for entrepreneurship because
they lack a critical mass of entrepreneurs. Without this critical mass,
innovators have fewer role models and must rely on “nonlocal sources of
information and technology,” which leads to less meaningful business
relationships. 105 The lack of successful role models can, in particular,
cause small firms to have “weak market and product development, a
particular problem of older industrial regions such as Pittsburgh.” 106
Similarly, since “[e]ducation levels appear strongly related to
entrepreneurial success and [are] associated with a greater range of
information sources and a wider set of customers and markets,”107 regions
that do not contain top-flight universities are at a natural disadvantage
compared to those that do.
Although a good location can certainly help, ultimately the success
or failure of a given enterprise is determined not by its location, but by
how well it is run. In the words of Edward Malecki, “[c]apital is actually
less critical to small business success than simpler, but less easily
supplied, inputs. Capital is secondary to information, business
knowledge, and management expertise.” 108 Thus, every region has the
potential to be a Silicon Valley; what is required to achieve that potential
is not a large stable of local venture capitalists but rather a thriving local
economy with rapid information transfer between firms, receptiveness to
innovation, and a labor pool of talented managers.
3. What the Lack of a Regional Equity Gap Means for Regulation A+
Two interviews with prominent venture capitalists succinctly
summarize the reasons why venture capital flows primarily to a small
number of locales. As one notes:

104. Id. at 131 (citing I. Turok & P. Richardson, New Firms and Local Development:
Evidence from West Lothian, 25 REGIONAL STUD. 71 (1991)).
105. Id. at 132.
106. Id. at 132 (citing R.S. Ahlbrandt, Adjusting to Changes in Traditional Markets:
The Problems of Small Manufacturers in Older Industrial Regions, 2 ECON. DEV. Q. 252
(1988)).
107. Id. at 134 (citing H. M. Miller et al., Southern Appalachian Handicrafts Industry:
Implications for Regional Economic Development, 17 REV. REGIONAL STUD. 50 (1987)).
108. Id. at 139 (citation omitted).
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[a]ll other things being equal, you want your venture capital to be
local. I can see it in my own work. I sit on the boards of two companies
in Virginia and four in California and the California firms see me ten
times more [than] the ones in Virginia. Whether it is just stopping by,
or brain-storming around a specific problem, they just get a lot more
of my attention because they’re right here. And entrepreneurs do get
it. If they are trying to build a successful company they know VCs can
help. We’re a sounding board, market research company, headhunter,
and we can connect them up with partners and suppliers. Plus, since
we review so many business plans in the course of our work and know
so many people in the business, we know what the larger movements
in the market are.109

Rounding out that point is this summary from the second interviewee:
“[w]hat we’re really selling is time. When you have a start-up, time is
your most precious commodity so you want to do anything that saves
it.”110 In an environment where droves of companies are all competing to
“quickly establish dominant brands and market share” (often in nascent,
rapidly changing markets), it is only natural for entrepreneurial firms to
cluster around the richest sources of funding and assistance, in order to
access that funding and assistance as rapidly, efficiently, and
continuously as possible. 111 Both venture capitalists and entrepreneurs
benefit from being physically located at the center of a system of tacit
knowledge—it provides them with a great deal of know-how and “knowwho” (i.e., contacts) that they otherwise would not have access to.112
Given this reality, simply throwing money at the problem will not
work. To the extent that Regulation A+ is an attempt to empower
communities currently underserved by venture capital firms by flooding
them with a new supply of capital, the results are likely to be lackluster.
It is not money itself that leads to prosperous ventures, but rather the
mentorship, monitoring, and connections that come with that money—
benefits that unaccredited investors are generally unable to provide. This
intuition was borne out in the early twenty-first century in experiments
conducted in the United Kingdom, which were intended to reduce a
perceived regional equity gap. The Hunter Center for Entrepreneurship in
Glasgow found that despite significant government efforts to increase the
109.
110.
111.
112.

Zook, supra note 33, at 638.
Id. at 639.
Id.
Id.
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supply of capital and reduce the perceived equity gap, the gap between
London and other regions of the United Kingdom has not been reduced
significantly and may have actually widened in the years after 2001.113 In
the United States, the experience of state-run venture capital funds in the
1980s tells a similar story. As one industry observer put it,
[d]uring the ’80s state governments got into venture capital as part of
a failed strategy to develop high-technology enclaves. Within a few
years those states saw most of their locally subsidized venture capital
get exported to Silicon Valley, Route 128, or other places with
promising high-tech start-ups; either that, or they saw their money go
to local companies that failed to generate any profits. Now many of
the states are reducing their commitment to venture capital or are
pulling out altogether.114

These failed attempts to remedy perceived regional equity gaps suggest
that the underlying problem is not a lack of capital but rather a lack of
talented entrepreneurs with the skills and knowledge needed to
commercialize technological breakthroughs. Entrepreneurial expertise is
hard to come by, and artificially inflating the supply of capital alone is
unlikely to change that.
This sentiment is echoed in the Kauffman Foundation’s educational
policy briefs, which encourage state and local governments to focus on
efforts to facilitate knowledge transfer rather than attempting to increase
the supply of capital115: “there must be a long-term focus on entrepreneurs
as individuals distinct from small businesses, who learn by doing and
interacting with others. These connections are locally embedded even if
entrepreneurs reach broad markets. The entrepreneurial experience is
personal, and it is local.”116 In short, the Foundation suggests cultivating
113. Colin Mason & Yannis Pierrakis, Venture Capital, the Regions, and Public
Policy: The United Kingdom Since the Post-2000 Technology Crash, 47 REGIONAL STUD.
1156, 1166, 1169 (2013). This analysis presumes that the relevant measure of the gap is
amount invested per region. If number of investments is the relevant measure, the gap
was reduced to a mild extent, but not dramatically.
114. Richard Florida, What Start-ups Don’t Need is Money, INC. (Apr. 1, 1994),
https://www.inc.com/magazine/19940401/2859.html [https://perma.cc/E35Q-DWD8].
115. See, e.g., Ewing Marion Kauffman Found., The Dos and Don’ts of Local
Entrepreneurship Promotion, ENTREPRENEURSHIP POL’Y DIG. (Mar. 24, 2014), https://
www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/resources/2014/entrepreneurship%20policy
%20digest/april%202014/entrepreneurship_policy_digest_april2014.pdf [https://perma.
cc/82RY-GS2M].
116. Id. at 21.
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networks and providing emotional support for entrepreneurs. The
Foundation discourages public investment funds, and for those states
where a public fund already exists, it suggests awarding many small
prizes rather than a single large one in order to create a large cohort of
entrepreneurs who can learn from each other.117 The Foundation prefers
other, more effective policy measures though, such as relaxing
professional licensing requirements, welcoming immigrants, streamlining
tax codes and payment systems, and ending the enforcement of noncompete agreements.118
The Kauffman Foundation likely understates the appeal of public
investing for a couple of important reasons. First, private investors (absent
government intervention) generally conduct less research and
development than would be socially optimal because they are unable to
financially capture the social benefits of their research. 119 Once social
impacts are taken into consideration, by some estimates, “the social rate
of return [to research and development] is between 150 and 200% of the
private rate of return; according to that, government’s intervention is
justified by means of market failure theories in order to . . . achieve a
socially optimal situation.”120 Second, while bureaucrats generally cannot
be trusted to “pick winners” when it comes to individual companies,
expert agencies such as the Department of Defense or the National
Institutes of Health have a fairly impressive track record of backing
technologies that have ultimately become world-changing.121 So there is
certainly solid theoretical foundation for using government funds to
encourage early-stage research, and some support for the idea of using
public funds to encourage socially beneficial ventures—although there is

117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id. at 2.
Itxaso del-Palacio, Francesc Sole & Xiaotian Tina Zhang, The Capital Gap for
Small Companies: Public Venture Capital to the Rescue?, 38 SMALL BUS. ECON. 283,
285 (2012) (citing J. Lerner, The Government as Venture Capitalist: The Long-Run
Impact of the SBIR Program, 72 J. BUS. 285 (1999)).
120. Id. at 285 (citing Z. Griliches, The Search for R&D Spillovers, 94 SCANDINAVIAN
J. ECON. S29 (1992); S. Lall, Technological Capabilities and Industrialization, 20
WORLD DEV. 165 (1992)).
121. See, e.g., MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING
PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS (2013) (discussing, among other things, the
government’s involvement in developing the Internet, GPS, touch-screen displays, and
Siri).
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no doubt that when it comes to providing funds to companies hoping to
commercialize already extant technology, private investment firms have
shown themselves to be much more adept than their government
counterparts.122
To the extent that crowdfunding participants play a role similar to
that of public investors and solely provide money without performing any
monitoring or advising, one can expect their investments to produce
relatively lackluster results. Thus, the “opening the floodgates” aspect of
Regulation A+ is unlikely to have a significant positive effect on the
vitality of early-stage companies. There are unique benefits that come
from taking “smart money,” and those benefits are not unlocked solely by
enabling startups to look to the public for funding.
C. SOCIAL REASONS TO ENCOURAGE CROWDFUNDING
1. Gender/Race Issues
While there is little evidence of an overarching need for more capital
(either locally or nationally), there may still be some other, more
pernicious systematic failings of the venture capital industry that are in
need of remedy. For example, it is well known that women receive less
venture capital funding than men: “less than 6% of venture capital funding
has historically gone to companies with female CEOs, and only 1.3% of
VC-backed companies have female founders.” 123 Minority-founded
companies also receive disproportionately low amounts of venture capital
funding.124 A recent Pepperdine University study confirms this disparity,
finding that “[m]inority-, female- and foreign-owned companies are
22.2%, 18.7% and 17.9% less likely [respectively] to successfully raise a
venture round than companies run by American-born white males.”125

122. See supra text accompanying note 114 (discussing the failure of various staterun venture capital funds).
123. Mollick, supra note 7, at 8 (citations omitted).
124. See, e.g., Venture Capital Demographics—87% of VC-Backed Founders Are
White; All-Asian Teams Raise Largest Funding Rounds, CB INSIGHTS (Aug. 3, 2010),
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/venture-capital-demographics-87-percent-vc-backedfounders-white-asian-teams-raise-largest-funding/ [https://perma.cc/8553-827Z]
(reporting that less than 1% of founders of VC-backed companies are African-American).
125. Timothy Hay, Female-, Minority-Run Startups Have Tougher Fundraising
Road, Study Says, WALL ST. J.: VENTURE CAP. DISPATCH (Oct. 30, 2014, 8:00 AM), https:
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Many believe that these shocking numbers are attributable to the low
number of female and minority investors at major venture capital funds
(which is borne out in the data—a 2011 survey found, for example, that
89% of venture capital partners were male and 76% were white males).126
In light of these disparities, there is a strong case to be made that “gender
and geographic biases . . . distort VC assessments.”127
If this disparity in funding stems not from economically rational
factors but rather from biases against women and minorities, we might
expect market forces to remedy the problem, since those spurned
businesses represent untapped opportunities and potential above-market
returns. And indeed, several venture capital funds targeting femalefounded companies have cropped up in recent years,128 such as Isabella
Capital, 129 Women’s Venture Capital Fund, 130 Texas Women’s
Ventures, 131 Cowboy Ventures, 132 Aspect Ventures, 133 Broadway
//blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2014/10/30/female-minority-run-startups-have-tougherfundraising-road-study-says/ [https://perma.cc/D2EL-AM8U] (citing John Paglia &
Maretno Agus Harjoto, The Effects of Private Equity and Venture Capital on Sales and
Employment Growth in Small and Medium Sized Businesses, 47 J. BANKING & FIN. 177
(2014)).
126. Scott Austin, White Men Still Dominate the Venture Industry, WALL ST. J.:
VENTURE CAPITAL DISPATCH (Nov. 21, 2011, 12:55 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/venture
capital/2011/11/21/venture-industry-still-dominated-by-white-males-survey/ [https://per
ma.cc/5QCE-B5XZ].
127. Mollick, supra note 7, at 3 (citing P. Greene & C. Brush, Patterns of Venture
Capital Funding: Is Gender a Factor?, 3 VENTURE CAP. 63 (2001); R. Harrison & C.
Mason, Does Gender Matter? Women Business Angels and the Supply of Entrepreneurial
Finance, 31 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRAC. 445 (2007); T. Stuart & O.
Sorenson, Liquidity Events and the Geographic Distribution of Entrepreneurial Activity,
48 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 175 (2003)).
128. Claire Cain Miller, Female-Run Venture Capital Funds Alter the Status Quo,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/02/business
/dealbook/female-run-venture-funds-alter-the-status-quo.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
Y628-935A].
129. Isabella Capital, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/isa
bella-capital [https://perma.cc/5EPU-FENG].
130. Investment Focus, WOMEN’S VENTURE CAP. FUND, https://www.womensvcfund
.com/investment-focus/ [https://perma.cc/LRM4-CPHH].
131. TEX. WOMEN VENTURES, https://www.texaswomenventures.com/ [https://perma
.cc/3SD7-LGZQ].
132. COWBOY VENTURES, https://cowboy.vc/ [https://perma.cc/9533-QTRM].
133. ASPECT VENTURES, https://aspectventures.com/ [https://perma.cc/2NLE-KM
AC].
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Angels, 134 Illuminate Ventures, 135 Forerunner Ventures, 136 and Aligned
Partners,137 to name a few. Minority-focused funds are harder to find, but
a few do exist.138 As promising as these funds are, the fact that they have
begun to crop up only recently despite the funding disparities having
existed for decades suggests that there are significant barriers to
remedying this problem.
To the extent that this is an issue, equity crowdfunding might help to
eliminate the disparity and address the market failure. If equity
crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to appeal to a wider, more diverse set
of investors, it might alleviate this bias and help ensure that female- and
minority-led startups are not underserved by capital markets. At least one
study of traditional (non-equity) crowdfunding has found that
“entrepreneurial quality is assessed in similar ways by both VCs and
crowdfunders, but . . . crowdfunding alleviates some of the geographic
and gender biases associated with the way that VCs look for signals of
quality.”139 The study found weak evidence that crowdfunders exhibit less
geographic bias than venture capitalists and strong evidence that
crowdfunders exhibit less gender bias than venture capitalists.140 Notably,
while only 1.3% of venture capital-backed companies have female
founders, over 21.1% of venture capital-eligible crowdfunded projects
studied had female founders.141 Yet broadly, the same signals used by
venture capitalists to assess viability of new ventures (e.g., past success,
third-party endorsements, preparedness, etc.) were also used by
134. BROADWAY ANGELS, https://www.broadway-angels.com/ [https://perma.cc/AP8
R-WUW7].
135. ILLUMINATE VENTURES, https://www.illuminate.com/ [https://perma.cc/6XALTGM9].
136. FORERUNNER VENTURES, https://forerunnerventures.com/ [https://perma.cc/WH
83-BQWA].
137. ALIGNED PARTNERS, https://www.alignedvc.com/ [https://perma.cc/7QXB-CG
4C].
138. See, e.g., NAT’L ANGEL MINORITY NETWORK, https://www.nmanetwork.com/
[https://perma.cc/QG5X-VDBB]; Wayne Sutton, The Search for Minority Entrepreneurs
Is Over—Now They Need to Be Ready for Investors, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 29, 2012),
https://techcrunch.com/2012/09/29/the-search-for-minority-entrepreneurs-is-over-nowthey-need-to-be-ready-for-investors/ [https://perma.cc/9MQA-4CB5] (referencing the
Minority Angel Investor Network and Mexican.VC, both of which primarily invest in
companies with minority founders).
139. Mollick, supra note 7, at 1.
140. Id. at 23-24.
141. Id. at 8, 24.
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crowdfunders, suggesting that the crowdfunders are making rational
investment decisions.142
However, crowdfunding is not panacea here; crowdfunders are likely
to be biased too, only in a different manner. Crowdfunding projects tend
to pick up steam with time since people prefer to invest in projects that
have already received significant funding.143 Friends and family are likely
to be the first investors in a crowdfunding project, so “[t]o the extent that
distant investors disproportionately rely on information revealed in the
investment decisions of others, friends and family might play an
important role in making early investments that generate that
information.”144 The upshot is that those with the largest and wealthiest
network of friends and family might achieve disproportionate success,
regardless of the actual merits of their projects.145 In other words, while
advances in technology in theory enable all modern-day entrepreneurs to
draw from the same global pool of capital, in practice that pool of capital
may only be accessible to those with a “sufficient base of offline
support.”146
2. Community Building
Another social reason to welcome equity crowdfunding is its
potential for community building. Consider the example of a community
that uses crowdfunding to revitalize its downtown area—perhaps by

142.
143.

Id. at 25.
Ajay K. Agrawal, The Geography of Crowdfunding 16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 16820, Feb. 2011).
144. Id. at 3-4.
145. This is in line with Matthew J. Salganik et al., Experimental Study of Inequality
and Unpredictability in an Artificial Cultural Market, 311 SCIENCE 854-56 (2006), which
finds a high level of path dependency in the popularity of songs on music downloading
sites. Specifically, Salganik finds that individuals were far more likely to download songs
that had been previously downloaded in significant numbers, and far less likely to
download songs that had not been popular. Id. When Salganik segregated the site into
different “worlds” with different download counters, the download rates in various
“worlds” varied wildly. Id. No world matched download rates of songs that were
downloaded anonymously. Id.
146. Agrawal, supra note 143, at 4.
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creating a public park or funding an “open lab.”147 Crowdfunding could
be a way for the community to both finance projects and gauge their
demand, while simultaneously getting “buy-in” from the community
(thereby increasing the chances that the users of the project are “sticky”
and highly engaged). If done correctly, equity crowdfunding could usher
a new era in local governance, empowering citizens to more directly
participate in the selection of public projects and assessment of local
expenditures. Of course, this goal could likely be served by purely
intrastate equity raises, so Regulation A+ does more than needed to secure
this benefit. But to the extent Regulation A+ facilitates such raises, it
constitutes a laudable advance.
D. FINAL REMARKS ON “DEMOCRATIZING ACCESS TO CAPITAL”
RATIONALE
In short, although Regulation A+ seems poised to address inequities
faced by female and minority entrepreneurs and also to facilitate
community projects, it offers limited promise of democratizing access to
early-stage capital in a way that spurs major economic development. This
would not be worrisome if the weak economics of the “democratizing
access to capital” rationale for the regulation were complemented by a
strong IPO facilitation rationale. Unfortunately, upon close scrutiny, the
IPO facilitation rationale appears to be highly tenuous as well.
III. EXAMINING THE IPO FACILITATION RATIONALE
A. THE NEED FOR IPOS
It is well known that IPOs are “broken,” and have been for some
time. As Steven Davidoff puts it, “[t]he small company initial public
offering (IPO) is dead. In 1997, there were 168 exchange-listed IPOs for
companies with an initial market capitalization of less than $75 million.
In 2012, there were seven such IPOs, the same number as in 2003.”148 The
147. Indeed, these are precisely the types of projects currently being funded on the
UK-based crowdfunding platform “Spacehive.” See Kevin Gray, Built by the Crowd: The
Changing World of Public Infrastructure, WIRED (Nov. 4, 2013), https://www.wired.co.
uk/magazine/archive/2013/11/features/built-by-the-crowd [https://perma.cc/3JPN-H3
5D].
148. Steven Davidoff, Disappearing Small IPOs and Lifecycle of Small Firms, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 6, 2014), https://blogs.law.harvard
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average time to IPO statistics tell a similar story: in 2000, the average age
of a company at its IPO was ten years; in 2005, it was twenty-one.149
Multiple explanations for the decline have been put forth, perhaps
the most popular being that “increased federal regulation and market
structure changes also driven by federal regulation” led to the falling
number of IPOs. 150 Whatever the cause, the decline is particularly
worrisome for venture capitalists, since they are highly dependent on
IPOs as a source of “exit” that allows them to cash out. However, the lack
of IPOs is problematic for consumers and the general public as well, since
there is empirical evidence that IPOs are good for the consumer, given
that (1) they herald “an era of reduced profits and greater consumer
mobility within an industry,”151 and (2) most of the employment produced
by new companies comes after the IPO stage.152 In fact, by one estimate,
“[u]p to 22 million jobs may have been lost because of our broken IPO
market.”153 Thus, Andrew W. Lo (the director of the MIT Laboratory for
Financial Engineering) was right to state that “[w]e should be very
concerned about this trend . . . . Capital markets are central to business
formation and economic growth, and if [public] listings are falling, that is
a sign there is not the same level of capital formation as there was in the
past.”154
Regulation A+, along with other provisions of the JOBS Act,
promises to address this problem by lowering the regulatory hurdles
involved in achieving liquidity for early-stage investors. In addition to
providing liquidity for early investors, the mini-IPO market will offer
businesses “many of the traditional benefits of the public offering process,
.edu/corpgov/2014/03/06/disappearing-small-ipo-and-lifecycle-of-small-firm/ [https://
perma.cc/DJ7Y-ZZ53].
149. Darren Dahl, Facing the Capital Gap, INC. (Feb. 1, 2006), https://www.inc.com
/magazine/20060201/priority-finance.html [https://perma.cc/585J-LV9B].
150. Davidoff, supra note 148.
151. R. Christopher Small, An IPO’s Impact on Rival Firms, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 15, 2014), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov
/2014/09/15/an-ipos-impact-on-rival-firms/ [https://perma.cc/9VU9-AEK2].
152. NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, supra note 22.
153. David Weild & Edward Kim, A WAKE-UP CALL FOR AMERICA, GRANT
THORNTON: CAPITAL MARKET SERIES 2 (2009). Note that this estimate is dramatically
higher than the 1.881 million figure listed in KENNEY ET AL., supra note 26.
154. Graham Bowley, Wall Street, the Home of the Vanishing I.P.O., N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 17, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/business/18place.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/T8LN-RKYG].
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including improved valuations relative to traditional private offerings
(due to the unrestricted nature of the securities) with scaled down
regulatory costs.” 155 This cost reduction can be easily quantified:
traditional IPO registration takes 1200 hours156 and can cost hundreds of
thousands of dollars.157 The SEC estimates that a Regulation A+ Tier 2
registration will cost $75,000,158 with some industry experts predicting
that this price will come down even further as practitioners adjust to
market needs (possibly by accepting equity as payment in lieu of cash).159
The annual reports required by Regulation A+ will take another 600 hours
and are estimated by the SEC to cost $60,000 a year.160 In contrast, the
annual cost of being a public company is estimated by
PricewaterhouseCoopers to be upwards of $1.5 million a year.161
Yet not all are convinced that Regulation A+ will have the promised
effect. For example, certain prominent Silicon Valley lawyers have gone
on record stating that the effects of the new rules will be negligible for

155. Josh Kalish, Regulation A+: A Practical Perspective, CROWDFUND INSIDER
(Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/04/65360-regulation-a-a-practi
cal-perspective/ [https://perma.cc/7SGW-2CEP].
156. Michael B. Dorff, The Siren Call of Equity Crowdfunding, 39 J. CORP. L. 493,
501 (2014) (citing Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1457, 1468-70 (2013)).
157. Id. at 501 (citing C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities
Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 27-28 (2012); Jason W. Parsont, Crowdfunding: The
Real and the Illusory Exemption, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 281, 292 (2014). PwC estimates
the cost of going public to be north of $1 million. PWC, CONSIDERING AN IPO? THE COSTS
OF GOING AND BEING PUBLIC MAY SURPRISE YOU (2012), https://www.pwc.com/en_us/
us/transaction-services/publications/assets/pwc-cost-of-ipo.pdf [https://perma.cc/7266NC8G].
158. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities
Act (Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 9741, Exchange Act Release No. 74,578,
2015 WL 1788375 (Mar. 25, 2015). Note that this estimate may well understate the costs.
159. Devin Thorpe, Crowdfunding Experts Address New Regulation A+ Rules Live,
FORBES (Apr. 9, 2015, 12:10 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/devinthorpe/2015/04/
09/crowdfunding-experts-address-new-regulation-a-rules-live/ [https://perma.cc/975XCC2X]. Note that this sentiment is not universal, and others expect costs to be
significantly higher than those estimated by the SEC.
160. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities
Act (Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 9741, Exchange Act Release No. 74,578,
2015 WL 1788375 (Mar. 25, 2015).
161. PWC, supra note 157.
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technology firms, especially those in Silicon Valley. 162 Among other
things, these experts question the “value of a mini-IPO market relative to
the existing private placement market, which is already a deep source of
funding that is unrestrained by the disclosure, audit and filing
requirements that will accompany Regulation A+ capital.”163 Similarly,
there is good reason to suggest that the root cause of the recent downtick
in IPO frequency is not regulation but rather decreased investor demand
for these securities. This section will address the controversy and
ultimately conclude that Regulation A+ will do little to fix the IPO
market.
B. SMALL COMPANY IPOS—DEAD FOR GOOD REASON?
A popular argument is that the decrease in IPOs can be traced to
increased regulation of public companies, with the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) often singled out as the main
culprit. 164 In support of this argument, many point to the increase in
listings in other, less-regulated countries since the passage of SOX in the
United States.165 And indeed, studies show that after the passage of Title
I of the JOBS Act, the value of public companies eligible for “Emerging
162. David Ruiz, New Mini-IPO Will Have Few Takers in the Valley, RECORDER
(Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.therecorder.com/id=1202721669638/New-MiniIPO-WillHave-Few-Takers-in-the-Valley?slreturn=20150301111550 [https://perma.cc/8XVN-S7
MD].
163. Kalish, supra note 155.
164. See, e.g., Bowley, supra note 154 (partially blaming regulations); Amy Feldman,
What Does Sarbanes-Oxley Mean for Companies That Want to Go Public?, INC. (Sept.
1, 2005), https://www.inc.com/magazine/20050901/surviving-so-sidebar.html [https://
perma.cc/UF8F-DAY2]; Wade Roush, Who’s Afraid of an IPO? Everybody, at the
Moment, XCONOMY (July 1, 2008), https://www.xconomy.com/national/2008/07/01/who
s-afraid-of-an-ipo-everybody-at-the-moment/ [https://perma.cc/Z47S-WFX4] (“In a
survey last week, the NVCA asked its own members to name the three biggest reasons
for the current IPO drought. . . . 77 percent named ‘skittish investors’ as a reason, while
64 percent pointed to the credit crunch resulting from the subprime-mortgage debacle,
and 57 percent blamed the high cost of complying with Sarbanes-Oxley accounting rules
for companies preparing to go public. A few other interesting reasons came up as well:
lack of analyst coverage of smaller companies (18 percent), a generally poor selection of
IPO candidates recently (15 percent), and the disappearance of investment banks willing
to invest in early-stage companies (14 percent).”).
165. See, e.g., Erika Brown, London Calling, FORBES (Apr. 21, 2006, 2:30 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/forbes/2006/0508/051.html [https://perma.cc/7XGP-A8ZX].
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Growth Company” status (and the commensurate reduced regulatory
compliance costs) jumped nearly 3.6%, suggesting that domestic public
company regulations exact a very real (and quantifiable) cost.166 But there
is good reason to think that the cost of regulatory compliance is only a
small part of the reason for the downswing in IPO activity. A new
consensus appears to be emerging that the decline in IPOs is attributable
to market factors rather than regulatory changes.
For example, a 2014 study by Steven Davidoff found as follows:
the evidence derived from the lifecycle of small IPOs points to supply
side changes, rather than regulatory changes, as the reason for the
vanished small IPO. In short, we believe that investors simply tired of
investing in these small IPOs due to their inability to survive and grow
in the public markets. In the absence of investor demand, supply side
forces [initially] still pushed these IPOs into the market . . . [but] have
[now] disappeared in light of technological and market structure
changes.167

In that same study, Davidoff found that the enactment of the JOBS Act
had little to no effect on small-company IPOs.168 Ultimately, Davidoff
suggests that relaxing IPO regulations “may only bring back companies
that are ill-suited to the public markets.”169
This is consonant with the picture painted by David Weild, former
Vice Chairman of NASDAQ. He argues that large brokerage firms have
lower profitability as a result of advancements in technology and changes
in regulation that increased competition and lowered trading costs.170 As
a result, such firms have shifted their focus from smaller companies’
stocks to those of larger companies.171 He sees this as a cause for alarm:
“[t]he whole ecosystem to support small-cap companies has shrunk . . . .
This infrastructure is every bit as important as bridges, roads and tunnels.
Without it, you undermine growth.”172

166. Dhammika Dharmapala & Vikramaditya S. Khanna, The Costs and Benefits of
Mandatory Securities Regulation: Evidence from Market Reaction to the JOBS Act of
2012, 1 J. L. FIN. & ACCT. 139 (2016).
167. Davidoff, supra note 148.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Bowley, supra note 154.
171. Id.
172. Id.

188

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXII

Another recent paper makes similar findings, arguing that (in
essence) “firms are being acquired rather than going public because in
many industries a small firm is worth more as part of a larger organization
than as an independent firm, whether it is public or private.”173 In other
words, the decrease in small company IPOs can be attributed to the
perception that most companies would fetch a lower valuation in a public
offering than they would in the context of a trade sale. 174 Crucially,
though, the authors find that these depressed public market prices are not
due to lack of analyst coverage or increased regulatory costs.175 Rather,
they find that trade sales offer better valuations simply because “earnings
are higher as part of a larger organization,” generally because of
economies of scope that allow larger companies to “speed new
technologies to market.”176 They conclude that “regulatory reforms aimed
at restoring the IPO ‘ecosystem’ will have only a modest ability to affect
IPO volume.”177 In sum, “while SOX . . . may have had some effect on
small company IPOs, the more fundamental problems are the lack of
profitable small company IPOs and the lack of small company IPOs that
grow and become highly profitable, earning high returns for investors.”178
Thus, there is ample reason to think a relaxed IPO regulatory regime
(i.e., the provision of “mini-IPOs”) will do little to stimulate the anemic
IPO market.
IV. POTENTIAL PITFALLS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT
The benefits of Regulation A+ are expected to be modest and largely
hard to quantify. With that in mind, for the regulation to be a sensible
measure, it must not increase harm to investors appreciably.
Unfortunately, there are myriad ways in which Regulation A+ in its
current form might expose investors to new harms, the most salient of
which are discussed below, along with some suggestions for reform.

173. R. Christopher Small, Where Have All the IPOs Gone?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 30, 2011), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/
12/30/where-have-all-the-ipos-gone/ [https://perma.cc/PV8D-55C2].
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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A. POTENTIAL PITFALLS
1. Behavioral Economics
Humans exhibit a systematic bias towards overvaluing long-shot
bets, due to the so called “optimism bias.”179 This effect likely stems from
irrationalities regarding the extent of human involvement in
fundamentally uncertain activities: “we act as though we can control
purely random events like lotteries and dice rolls when[ever] there is a
veneer—no matter how thin—of individual action involved.”180 Given the
boom-or-bust nature of early-stage investing, equity crowdfunding is
uniquely poised to activate this bias, to ill effect.
To illustrate the potential magnitude of the problem, consider that
the average American family has $3800 in savings. 181 Each year,
Regulation A+ allows that family to risk up to 10% of its net worth or
10% of its income—whichever is higher—on Tier 2 equity crowdfunding
raises. 182 Given that the median U.S. household income was roughly
$54,000 in 2014,183 in practice, this means the average American family
has the potential to wipe out the entirety of its savings by participating in
Regulation A+ offerings in any given year. Based on data predating the
adoption of Regulation A+, even among angel investors—a sophisticated
group of investors who are able to carefully vet each investment—over
half of the individual investments made result in a loss.184 The top 10% of

179. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STANFORD L. REV. 1471 (1998); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic
Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 806
(1980).
180. Dorff, supra note 156, at 522 (citing ELLEN J. LANGER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
CONTROL 59-90 (1983)).
181. Michael Maiello, 47% of Americans Can’t Save Any Money, DAILY BEAST (Apr.
14, 2015, 4:05 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/04/14/47-of-american
s-can-t-save-any-money.html [https://perma.cc/HJG9-LS5Q].
182. Under Tier 1, they can risk as much money as they want. See Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, supra note 45.
183. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
NO. P60-252, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2014 (2015), https://www.
census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p60-252.pdf [https://pe
rma.cc/SZ2D-V79V].
184. ROBERT WILTBANK & WARREN BOEKER, RETURNS TO ANGEL INVESTORS IN
GROUPS (Nov. 2007), https://sites.kauffman.org/pdf/angel_groups_111207.pdf [https://
perma.cc/K5UT-TDD8].
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the investors take home 50% of the total gains, with a mere 10% of the
investments garnering 75% of the total returns.185 If this distribution holds
true in the crowdfunding context, then there will be a small number of
investors with huge wins and a much larger number that experience losses
they are ill-equipped to bear. 186 When combined with the human
propensity to overvalue long-shot bets referenced above, the results could
be devastating.
2. The Lemons Problem
One lesser concern is that if equity crowdfunding is perceived by
entrepreneurs as a funding-route-of-last-resort, then the companies
engaging in crowdfunding will generally be those with low potential for
success, and those who invest in such companies will be “virtually certain
to lose their money.”187 While the prospect of losing money is not foreign
to early-stage investors, in this context it could be disastrous because, as
Michael Dorff describes,
the losses most issuers inflict will not be offset by a few huge winners.
Investors will not find tomorrow’s Googles on crowdfunding portals
because they will not be there; instead, start-ups with real potential
will continue to use other programs, such as the newly expanded Rule
506 exemption. This outcome is the inevitable result of the nature of
start-up investing and crowdfunding.188

Rory Eakin, Chief Operating Officer of the crowdfunding platform
CircleUp, makes a similar prediction: “[i]f issuers can fundraise using
Regulation D—no blue sky, audited financial, or ongoing reporting
requirements—why will they raise under Reg A+? Similar to Title III, I
only see Reg A+ working in edge cases.”189

185.
186.

Id.
This effect is only further exacerbated by the investment caps of Regulation A+,
which limit the ability of the average investor to diversify appreciably.
187. Dorff, supra note 156, at 493.
188. Id.
189. Rory Eakin, The JOBS Act Is Progress but Much Remains to Be Done,
TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 29, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/03/29/the-jobs-act-is-progr
ess-but-much-remains-to-be-done/ [https://perma.cc/7BYG-EDPP]. Note that CircleUp
is a platform designed for accredited investors only—so Mr. Caldbeck is probably a
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While only time will tell if these predictions have merit, there are at
least some reasons to think legitimate start-ups might prefer retail
crowdfunding instead. For example, worthwhile start-ups might be drawn
to retail crowdfunding over other options (such as venture capital)
because retail crowdfunding might offer more attractive valuations and
less intrusive investors. Similarly, retail crowdfunding might be a better
source of funding for companies with long, slow growth trajectories that
have been traditionally spurned by venture capitalists seeking rapid exits.
In addition, private financings done under Regulation D generally
produce restricted shares 190 subject to a “liquidity discount” which
constrains the company’s valuation;191 Regulation A+ shares are freely
tradable,192 which should result in higher valuations. Finally, consumerfacing companies might prefer crowdfunding for the increased visibility
it brings and its capacity for creating a built-in class of brand/product
evangelists. In all likelihood, retail crowdfunding probably will not attract
the most pedigreed of high growth companies, but that does not mean it
does not have an important role to play in the early-stage capital
ecosystem.
3. Dilution
The problem of dilution, wherein a founder or a seed-level investor
sees his equity stake in the company—and thus the value of his
biased source on this topic. Note also that Regulation D offerings require audited
financials generally and at least an audited balance sheet.
190. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Investor Bulletin: Private Placements Under
Regulation D, SEC (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins
/ib_privateplacements.html [https://perma.cc/5WWK-W65A] (“Generally, most
securities that you acquire in a private placement will be restricted securities.”).
191. Peter H. Ehrenberg, Raising Capital for the Emerging Private Company: An
Introduction to the Inherent Legal Risks and Opportunities of the Capital Raising
Process, LOWENSTEIN SANDLER (Mar. 2001), https://www.lowenstein.com/publications
/articles/detail.aspx?PubID=624 (“The restrictions on resale that typically apply in the
context of private placements significantly impact the substantive arrangements
negotiated between emerging companies and their new investors. Since such investors
may be required to hold their shares indefinitely, and since often there can be no
assurance that an active public trading market will ever develop, purchasers in private
placements who are precluded from reselling their shares promptly will pay less than they
would pay for freely tradeable securities in a comparably positioned company. This
discount (called an illiquidity discount) may approach 50%.”).
192. See supra note 53.
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investment—drastically reduced in later rounds of financing, is a very real
issue for early-stage startup participants. This problem has historically
been a big concern with the CROWDFUND Act,193 and it applies with
equal force in the Regulation A+ context.194 The concern is so prominent
that one United Kingdom equity crowdfunding site, Crowdcube,
explicitly mentions dilution in the investment disclaimer on its
homepage.195 While dilution is a concern for any investor, this concern is
particularly dangerous for crowdfunding investors given that (1) they
generally lack the expertise needed to recognize this as a risk and
negotiate contractual provisions protecting against it, and (2) even
crowdfunders savvy enough to know this is a risk still face a “collective
action problem” in that if the pool of investors is massive and widely
dispersed (with each individual contributing only a small slice of the
overall investment), then no one individual has a proper economic
incentive to expend significant time and effort negotiating specific
contractual protections against dilution (or enforcing those protections
post-investment).
One way to address this risk would be for the SEC to require that all
shares distributed in Regulation A+ raises include certain anti-dilution
provisions. However, this would probably be an unnecessary overreach
and further deter businesses from raising capital via Regulation A+. At
most, the SEC should require prominent disclosure of the anti-dilution
protections attached to the shares being offered (if any). It is likely that
with adequate disclosure and anti-fraud protection (backstopped by the
limitations imposed by fiduciary duty law), the market will determine the
193. See, e.g., Jack Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act:
Zuckerberg, Saverin and Venture Capitalists’ Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 583 (2013). The specific concern is that early investors might be robbed of
the benefit of their investment if the company later issues additional shares (either to new
investors or company executives) in exchange for little to no consideration, effectively
diluting the early investors’ stake in the company and reducing their payout upon an exit
event. A famous example of this was Mark Zuckerberg’s attempt to dilute Eduardo
Saverin’s holdings in Facebook from 30% to 0.03%. Id.
194. See, e.g., Cherly Connor, ‘Do You Really Want Dumb Money?’ Barry Schuler,
On Crowdfund Equity’s Dark Sides, FORBES (Nov. 3, 2011), https://www.forbes.com/site
s/cherylsnappconner/2013/11/03/do-you-really-want-dumb-money-barry-schuler-oncrowdfund-equitys-dark-sides/ [https://perma.cc/V5AD-Q29X] (discussing the dangers
of dilution in the equity crowdfunding context and referencing Facebook’s infamous
decision to dilute Eduardo Saverin’s stock in the company).
195. CROWDCUBE, https://www.crowdcube.com/ [https://perma.cc/758N-EBJT].
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proper level of anti-dilution protection on its own (especially if the
collective action problem is addressed through the encouragement of
syndication, as discussed in Section IV.B.4 below).
4. Fraud
Perhaps the most widely discussed risk of allowing general
solicitation is the risk of fraud, which reared its head once already in
recent memory in the context of Rule 504.196 The episode in question
began in 1992, when the SEC amended Rule 504 so that it no longer
banned general solicitations.197 At the time, it was thought that for such
small offerings, a hands-off approach was justified and state securities
regulators could be relied upon to prevent fraud;198 however, this reliance
proved to be misplaced. Almost immediately after the rule was amended,
many issuers and traders began using the exemption to sell and trade
worthless securities in microcap “pump-and-dump” schemes, often over
the (then-new) internet.199 The incidence of fraud was so widespread that
the SEC ultimately opted to amend Rule 504 to ban general
solicitations.200 While fraud in the Regulation A+ context will likely take
a different form, this historical vignette illustrates the ingenuity and
prevalence of unscrupulous securities market participants. Early signs
seem to indicate that outright fraud is not rampant in the crowdfunding
space,201 but this will have to be closely policed going forward.
196.
197.

17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2016).
C. Steven Bradford, Securities Regulation and Small Business: Rule 504 and the
Case for an Unconditional Exemption, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 14 (2001).
198. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ADOPTION OF AMENDMENTS TO RULE 504: FACT SHEET
(1999), https://www.sec.gov/news/extra/micro504.txt [https://perma.cc/5R5N-CQ42].
199. Id.
200. Dorff, supra note 156, at 507 (citing Hazen, supra note 14, at 1763-64).
201. Can Crowdfunding Democratize Access to Capital?, supra note 10 (finding that
Kickstarter-funded projects’ on-time delivery rates are comparable to those of other
funding sources); Solomon, supra note 11 (suggesting that intrastate equity
crowdfunding is primarily being used by legitimate companies such as craft brewers and
butcher shops); John Tozzi, Crowdfunding’s on Hold. So Is Crowdfunding Fraud,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 4, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-0404/crowdfundings-on-hold-dot-so-is-crowdfunding-fraud [https://perma.cc/AS9R-GJ
R3] (stating that regulator fears have not been justified so far, and that regulators have so
far only found one case of crowdfunding fraud to point to). But see Shelly Banjo, Once
Idealistic, Crowdfunding Is Now an Unholy Hybrid of Retail, Investment, and Risk,
QUARTZ, https://qz.com/389001/once-idealistic-crowdfunding-is-now-an-unholy-hybrid

194

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXII

5. Decreased Protection from State Regulators
An additional concern specific to the Tier 2 exemption under
Regulation A+ is that by preempting state securities regulators, the
regulation removes one of the traditional sources of protection for
investors and thus puts them in harm’s way. State regulators, in contrast
to the SEC, “are closer, more accessible, and more in touch with the local
and regional economic issues,” making them (in theory) well suited to
referee small, local securities transactions. 202 This unique position
explains why “states have historically been the primary ‘cops on the beat’
in the regulation of all areas of small business capital formation.” 203
Despite the historical prominence of state securities regulators, in practice
they have proven to be significantly less active than the SEC in
commenting on filings, and even in cases when they do take action, their
record is far from perfect (as alluded to in the Introduction above).204 To
the extent state regulators are doing more harm than good, this particular
concern with Regulation A+ may be unfounded, and pre-emption may
well be a sensible policy.

-of-retail-investment-and-risk/
[https://perma.cc/AT92-DEC5]
(arguing
that
crowdfunded companies often take advantage of a lack of accountability); Dave Johnson,
With Crowdfunding, Odd Often Competes with Fraud, CBS MONEYWATCH (July 14,
2014), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/with-crowdfunding-odd-often-competes-withfraud/ [https://perma.cc/BBA7-4BWB] (discussing Healbe GoBe, a crowdfunding
campaign that raised over $1 million for a wristband claiming to implement an impossible
technology, and “Home Quantum Energy Generator,” a crowdfunding campaign that
raised over $18,000 by claiming to have created free energy).
202. Noam Noked, The JOBS Act: An Investor Protection Disaster Waiting to
Happen, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 26, 2012),
https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/03/26/the-jobs-act-an-investor-protectiondisaster-waiting-to-happen/ [https://perma.cc/S2X2-TW7U]; O’Sullivan, supra note 11
(discussing action by FINRA shutting down Virginia-based crowdfunding portal over
allegations that it overlooked various red flags, include failure of certain participating
companies to file required paperwork with the SEC).
203. Noked, supra note 202.
204. See supra Introduction; see also Leslie Scism & Mark Maremon, Regulators
Missed Chance to Block Bad Deals, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 22, 2015) (describing the failure
of state regulators to prevent 25-year old Alexander Chatfield Burns from buying two
large insurance companies with fraudulent securities and siphoning hundreds of millions
of dollars from the companies).
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6. The Risks of Distant Ownership
One final concern is that enabling general solicitation encourages
distant ownership, which is harmful in and of itself. There is research
indicating that firms with a higher degree of local ownership are “more
profitable and have more independent boards,”205 and are less likely to be
named in class action lawsuits than their distantly owned counterparts.206
The theoretical underpinning of this effect is that managers of firms with
more local ownership are subject to more close and meaningful
monitoring, making them less likely to engage in various undesirable (and
unprofitable) activities such as “empire building,”207 “leading the quiet
life,” 208 aggressively managing earnings, 209 and backdating options. 210
This close monitoring often takes the form of shareholders that are “more
likely to introduce shareholder proposals, increase CEO turnover, and
reduce excess CEO compensation” 211 —in effect, putting direct and
continuous pressure on the company’s management to perform. The
implication, of course, is that to the extent that Regulation A+ facilitates
the raising of money from distant, widely dispersed investors, we can
expect an increase in empire building and other undesirable corporate
activities.
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
Given these issues, Regulation A+ could be improved in a number
of ways. Four of the most pressing needs are addressed below.
1. Anti-fraud Measures
Fraud must be closely policed. Regulation A+ exposes an
unsophisticated class of investors to an entirely new asset class. Given the
205. Vidhi Chhaochharia et al., Local Investors and Corporate Governance, 54 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 42, 43 (2012).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. R. Christopher Small, Local Investors and Corporate Governance, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 6, 2012), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu
/corpgov/2012/06/06/local-investors-and-corporate-governance/ [https://perma.cc/P8TS
-SKFA].
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collective action problem involved in monitoring a retail crowdfunded
investment coupled with the relative lack of sophistication of retail
crowdfunding investors, the potential for fraud here is enormous. And
indeed, our brief experiment with allowing general solicitation under Rule
504 in the 1990s confirmed that there is no shortage of fraudsters willing
to sell sham securities to the public.212
To combat this, the SEC might consider heightened antifraud
liability in this context, perhaps in the form of treble damages or strict
liability. Of course, this is a bit of a balancing act—too much liability will
result in no one using this financing mechanism, but too little liability will
allow fraudsters to run free. The bad actor provisions that have been
included in the rules213 should also help to guard against fraud. These,
coupled with fiduciary duty law, should go a long way towards
discouraging fraudsters from making use of Regulation A+ for their
deviant schemes.
Another novel technique that may help is the use of a “public
shaming service”—i.e., a publicly available central database of bad actors
maintained by the SEC. This database could include additional
information such as the type of company the bad actor was pitching, the
crowdfunding platform the bad actor used, etc. This measure would have
the dual benefits of alerting investors to trends in fraudulent activity and
of pressuring crowdfunding platforms into self-policing for fraud.
Interestingly, private services providing a similar function have cropped
up already;214 given their existence, it would be wise for the SEC to work
with these services and to adjust disclosure requirements to aid them in
their efforts.
2. Diversification
Investors must be encouraged to diversify appreciably. It has been
shown that U.S. investors already hold under-diversified portfolios and
are especially likely to under-diversify if they are young, low-income, less

212.
213.
214.

See Hazen, supra note 14, at 1763-64.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 45.
Rebecca Burn-Callander, Crowdfunding Charlatans to Be Named and Shamed
by New Rating Start-up, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 17, 2015), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finan
ce/newsbysector/banksandfinance/11868437/Crowdfunding-charlatans-to-be-named-an
d-shamed-by-new-rating-start-up.html [https://perma.cc/49VX-VBY5].
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educated, or less sophisticated.215 Diversification is likely to be a problem
in the crowdfunding context because the relatively small annual caps on
investments contained in Regulation A+ could easily push unaccredited
investors into preferring to place one large bet over multiple small bets.
Given how time consuming it is to vet an early-stage investment and how
little money will be at play (generally), it will be far too tempting for the
average investor to place all his eggs in one basket rather than exerting
the immense time and effort it would take to build up a diversified
portfolio.
Two solutions might help. First, investors should receive a notice (in
plain English) before investing, explaining the importance of
diversification.216 Taking a page out of Thaler’s book, it might be further
required that these notices show how retirement income flows would
differ in different scenarios—some involving diversified portfolios,
others with portfolios highly concentrated in a few key stocks. 217
Investors might be required to certify that they understand that “projected
. . . income typically doubles as an employee switches from a concentrated
portfolio with a single stock to a diversified portfolio.”218 The SEC could
even require the potential investor to take a quiz on finance theory,
although this last requirement is likely to be too onerous to help. A
second, more intrusive and paternalistic option is to impose a second layer
of capping targeted at individual investment sizes. While each investor
would remain limited to investing the greater of 10% of his net worth or
income per year, he will also be limited from investing more than 20% of
this overall cap on any one company. This would encourage investors to
diversify at least modestly; however, it might also encourage investors to
put money in less-than-ideal companies simply to ensure that they have
the maximum possible amount of capital deployed. This may also limit
certain investors to investments too small to be worthwhile.

215. William N. Goetzmann & Alok Kumar, Equity Portfolio Diversification, 12
REV. FIN. 433 (2008).
216. This idea is borrowed from Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Sell More
Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Diversification in 401(k) Accounts
3 (2003) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Richard_Thale
r/publication/228805997_Using_behavioral_economics_to_improve_diversification_in
_401_(k)_plans_Solving_the_company_stock_problem/links/0912f50eb073313d16000
000.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8FP-DUZ9].
217. Id.
218. Id.
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3. Intrastate Emphasis
Intrastate offerings should be encouraged to the extent possible. This
runs somewhat counter to the “democratizing access to capital” rationale,
but given that the case for a regional equity gap is weak and that firms
with local investors engage in less undesirable activity, intrastate
fundraising offers a clear advantage over more dispersed fundraising
campaigns. Intrastate offerings could be directly encouraged through a
number of mechanisms, such as tax breaks, decreased disclosure and
reporting requirements, and expedited review. These mechanisms could
be used individually or in tandem.
However, we need not place undue focus on encouraging purely
intrastate offerings. Syndicated offerings involving at least one local lead
investor capture many of the same benefits of intrastate offerings without
unduly limiting the pool of available capital. Thus, the most elegant
solution (and likely the most cost-effective one) is to focus on
syndication. This task—the encouragement of syndication—is taken up
below.
4. Syndication
Encouraging (or requiring) syndication with one large “lead”
investor is likely the most powerful measure available to the SEC to
minimize the risks of crowdfunding to retail investors. This is, after all,
the mechanism venture capitalists and angel investors use to make
prudent long-distance investments, and while it is not a perfect fit for the
retail crowdfunding context it could certainly ameliorate the collective
action problems described above. And in fact, in the United Kingdom at
least one crowdfunding platform explicitly endorses this model by
encouraging large angel investors to partner with a crowd of small retail
investors.219 Unfortunately, it is far from obvious how syndication can be
best encouraged by regulators.
One forceful way to encourage syndication would be to require that
each Regulation A+ raise have at least one investor who monitors the
company and attends all company board meetings. This measure,

219. Freddie Dawson, The Crowdfunding Site That Lets You Play with Sharks or
Dragons, FORBES (June 27, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/freddiedawson/2014/06
/27/the-crowd-funding-site-that-lets-you-play-with-sharks-or-dragons/ [https://perma.cc
/R5JF-CTSF] (describing the crowdfunding platform “Syndicate Room”).
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however, would be highly paternalistic and difficult to enforce in practice.
A less forceful method might provide reduced fraud liability or disclosure
requirements for companies who do a Regulation A+ raise involving at
least one “lead investor.” Yet this solution has problems of its own—
namely, that it would be difficult to define “lead investor” in a way that
ensures the person acting as lead investor provides meaningful
monitoring, oversight, and mentoring to the company.
Luckily, coercive measures may prove to be entirely unnecessary.
There is at least some reason to think that market forces are capable of
addressing the problem without the need for government intervention. In
a recent working paper, MIT Sloan Professor Christian Catalini suggests
that syndication may be the “killer app” of equity crowdfunding and
observes that syndication has already arisen naturally as a method for
division of labor between geographically dispersed angel investors.220 To
illustrate his point, Catalini explores AngelList’s syndication system in
depth. Under AngelList’s system, lead investors perform in-person due
diligence and deal sourcing in exchange for receiving a share of the profits
earned by geographically dispersed “backer” investors who simply supply
additional capital for the syndicated deal.221 In this way, the lead investor
is able to leverage his reputation and diligence efforts while the passive
investors are able to outsource the task of vetting and monitoring the
investment. 222 This division of labor arrangement has proven so
compelling that syndicated deals are now vastly more common than nonsyndicated deals on AngelList, despite the syndication option having only
become available in July 2013. 223 Importantly, the median investment
amount in these syndicated deals is a mere $2500,224 which implies that
transaction costs will not be a barrier to bringing syndication to retail
equity crowdfunders (who generally only have small sums of money to
invest).
Of course, a trade-off is inherent here: the more syndication with
professional investors is encouraged, the less we can expect equity
crowdfunding to ameliorate the well-documented biases of that powerful
group. So, syndication is a double-edged sword: it is probably the only
way to ensure that crowdfunders have a decent chance of evaluating

220. Ajay Agrawal, Christian Catalini & Avi Goldfarb, Are Syndicates the Killer App
of Equity Crowdfunding?, 58 CALIF. MGMT. REV. 111 (2016).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 3-4.
223. Id. at 2.
224. Id. at 4.
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human factors like the cohesiveness of the founding team, yet it has the
unfortunate effect of fixing in place systemic biases against female- and
minority-owned companies. Given that market-based syndication
facilitators have already emerged and that overemphasizing syndication
risks undermining the social positives of Regulation A+, policymakers
would do well to use a light touch when implementing reforms designed
to encourage syndication.
C. LIMITS OF SECURITIES LAW
Ultimately, the root of the problem goes much deeper than securities
law. As the Silicon Valley examination suggests, the birth of a high-tech
center comes not from a rush of private capital backing commercialization
efforts, but rather through decades of grants and initiatives aimed at
enabling early-stage research. This makes sense—given the difficulty of
capturing the full extent of the social benefits from early-stage research
(e.g., due to imperfect intellectual property protection), we cannot expect
private markets to properly fund this public good, no matter how large we
make the pool of market participants. Thus, to best encourage
technological advances, this Article proposes increasing grants for early
stage research and increasing preferential tax treatment for expenditures
on research and development. Additionally, as the Kauffman Foundation
suggests, the cultivation of a professional class of entrepreneurial
managers is best done not by increasing access to capital but rather
through programs which facilitate the formation of relationships and the
transmission of knowledge among entrepreneurs. While federal securities
law is ill-suited to make this happen, local initiatives (both public and
private) hold the potential to appreciably further this goal.
One innovative solution, proposed by Darden professor Saras
Sarasvathy, is to focus federal funds and initiatives on the task of
educating investors.225 Ideally, the principles of investing would be taught
in public schools of all levels, with more advanced courses available on a
community-by-community basis at community colleges and the like.
Funding and resources could be provided to support the formation of local
investment clubs. Even relatively sophisticated parties, such as executives
in manufacturing companies, could benefit from educational programs
tailored towards explaining how to evaluate potential equity-based
225. This suggestion was derived from personal conversations between the author and
Prof. Sarasvathy.
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partnerships and joint ventures with up-and-coming startup companies. If
well designed, such programs could constitute a powerful “carrot” to
complement the “stick” of SEC sanctions and review. Indeed, a
comprehensive program of this type would address nearly every pitfall
described in Section IV.A above: it would minimize irrationalities
exhibited by naïve investors (by explaining away myths and introducing
rational investment practices); it would increase the proportion of
intrastate investment (thereby increasing the level of active monitoring);
it would encourage diversification (by allowing small groups to share in
the work of vetting investments, thereby making placing several small
bets a more economically viable choice); and it would help investors
guard against fraud (since investors could draw on their instructors and
fellow club members to help spot fraudulent investment opportunities).
CONCLUSION
Regulation A+ holds some promise, but also much danger. Two
prominent rationales for the measure—democratizing access to capital
and reinvigorating the IPO market—appear to be largely baseless.
However, Regulation A+ has the potential to ameliorate much of the
systematic bias observed in the venture capital industry regarding femaleand minority-founded companies. Additionally, Regulation A+ may well
develop a niche within the early-stage capital ecosystem as a source of
funds for community projects. As laudable as these advances are, we must
remember that Regulation A+’s promise to change the status quo
necessarily implicates new risks. In particular, Regulation A+ invites
fraud, risks bankrupting ordinary investors, and is likely to have a
negative impact on corporate governance. While its ultimate impact is
impossible to determine ex ante, certain amendments and supplements
would undoubtedly help ensure that its ultimate goal—economic
development—is achieved with only minimal harmful side effects. These
include heightened anti-fraud liability, measures designed to encourage
diversification, and increased incentives to syndicate. A more
comprehensive plan would go beyond securities law by instituting
educational programs combined with seeding the formation of local
investment clubs, thereby ensuring that retail equity crowdfunders have
the tools they need to properly navigate the choppy waters of this new
asset class.

